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JURISDICTION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to transfer 
from the Utah Supreme Court which had jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)(k) (1996) and Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. In viewing the totality of the evidence presented to the jury, in a light most 
favorable to Bradley Bryant, and with the benefits of all inferences which the evidence 
fairly supports, did the trial court err in refusing to grant a motion for directed verdict or 
grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict? 
The standard of review for denial of a motion for directed verdict and judgment 
n.o.v. is the same — both raise the issue of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Both are 
reviewed by an appellate court in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and 
afford him the benefit "of all inferences which the evidence fairly supports." McCloud v. 
Baum, 569 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977). 
2. Did the trial court err in refusing to administer Plaintiffs proposed jury 
questionnaire regarding tort reform, and if so, did the error substantially impair Plaintiffs 
ability to make informed peremptory challenges? 
The questioning of a juror "is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, and its rulings with respect thereto will not be disturbed on appeal absent a 
demonstrated abuse of discretion." Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 394 (Utah 
App. 1995); quoting from Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 
932 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The law of the case from the trial court is the instructions given. The jury was 
instructed on left-hand turns as follows: 
The driver of a vehicle turning left must yield to vehicles close 
enough to represent an immediate hazard. However, a driver is not 
compelled to remain in an intersection indefinitely waiting to turn. The 
driver must make reasonable observations and yield when reasonably 
necessary. 
(R. 803) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a personal injury action filed by John Durrant, plaintiff and appellant, 
against Bradley E. Bryant and Utah Transit Authority, defendants and appellees (R. 001). 
The basis for the complaint was negligence on the part of the two defendants (R. 002). 
On September 30, 1993, Mr. Durrant was traveling northbound on Riverdale Road in the 
outside lane (T. Vol. I 1266). He struck Mr. Bryant's vehicle just behind his front tire on 
the passenger side of his vehicle as Mr. Bryant was attempting to complete a left hand 
turn (T. Vol. I 1068). Traffic conditions were heavy on Riverdale Road because of 
construction on Riverdale Road which directed all vehicles in the outside northbound 
lane to merge to the inside lane (T. Vol. II 1266). Mr. Bryant had waited in the turn lane 
for someone to be kind enough to stop and allow him to turn (T. Vol. I 1067). A UTA 
bus driver stopped and allowed Mr. Bryant to proceed into the inside lane (T. Vol. I 
1067). Mr. Bryant could not see through the bus and had to rely on the bus driver to 
direct his actions thereafter (T. Vol. I 1067). The bus driver directed him to proceed, then 
directed him to stop, checked his mirror and directed him to proceed again (T. Vol. I 
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1067-1069). Mr. Durrant explained he was heading north in the outside lane and saw a 
place to merge behind the bus. He started to merge behind the bus and then saw a space 
in front of the bus. He changed his mind and attempted to merge in front of the bus (T. 
Vol.11082). 
B. Course of the Proceedings. 
Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was filed October 26, 1994 (R. 001). 
Bradley Bryant's Amended Answer was filed November 14, 1994 (R. 058); UTA's 
Answer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was filed December 14, 1994 (R. 072). 
Mr. Bryant also filed a Cross Claim against UTA on March 26, 1996 (R. 163). 
Trial was originally scheduled for July 23, 1996 (R. 138). Because plaintiff had 
been in an additional accident, the trial was postponed in order to obtain an IME of the 
plaintiff (R. 208). The trial was thereafter scheduled for October 30, 1996 (R. 213). 
On October 10, 1996, plaintiff filed a Motion to Submit a Questionnaire to the 
Jury Panel (R. 436). No Order was ever entered denying said Motion. However, the 
questionnaire was not submitted to the jury on October 30, 1996. The plaintiff passed the 
jury for cause (R. 528). However, not enough jurors remained to allow peremptory 
challenges, and a mistrial was declared (R. 528). 
A new trial date was set for February 18, 1997 (R. 529). Plaintiffs Motion to 
Submit a Questionnaire to the Jury Panel was not renewed. The trial court questioned the 
jury regarding potential bias and opinions as well as tort reform and excessive verdicts (T. 
Vol. I 899-995). During the trial court's voir dire, the trial court excused 10 jurors for 
cause (T. Vol. I 899-955). The counsel for all parties thereafter questioned the potential 
jurors (T. Vol. I 955-1030). No objections were made by plaintiff to the jury or the 
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questions asked by the trial court. The jury was impaneled only after counsel for the 
plaintiff had passed the jury for cause (T. Vol. 11030; R. 613). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. 
After the jury instructions were read to the jury, the jury retired and returned with 
the Special Verdict. The Special Verdict found Bradley E. Bryant to not be negligent and 
UTA to not be negligent (R. 828). 
A Memorandum of Costs was filed by Bradley E. Bryant on April 29, 1997 (R. 
863-880). The Judgment on the Verdict was filed on May 1, 1997 (R. 881-884). An 
Objection to Mr. Bryant's Memorandum of Costs was filed on May 7, 1997 (R. 885-889). 
This Motion is still pending in the trial court. A Notice of Appeal was filed May 23, 
1997 (R. 890-893). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury verdict found Bradley Bryant to not be negligent. Sufficient evidence in 
the record exists for the jury to find Mr. Bryant's actions were reasonable under the 
totality of the facts presented to them, including the heavy traffic conditions, the merge 
signs for the northbound outside lane of travel, the UTA bus driver stopping in the inside 
lane for Mr. Bryant to proceed to make his turn, the inability of Mr. Bryant to see through 
the bus thereby necessitating a reliance upon the instructions of the bus driver as to the 
ability of him to execute a safe turn, the bus driver's clear directions to Mr. Bryant of 
proceeding, stopping, and then finally to proceed forward, and Mr. Bryant's inability to 
avoid the accident once his vision was clear of the bus. 
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Plaintiffs own brief indicates enough evidence exists for a jury to conclude 
"Bryant was reasonable in his reliance on the bus driver's signal (Brief of Appellant, p. 
6)." 
Further, even if a statutory violation occurred, the jury had sufficient evidence to 
conclude justification or excuse existed to overcome any presumption of negligence. 
The jury was properly impaneled. The trial court did not limit the questioning of 
plaintiffs counsel. The questions asked were sufficient to reveal any potential bias or 
opinions regarding tort reform and excessive jury verdict. The trial court carefully 
guarded against any tainting of the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Grant Plaintiffs Motion 
For a Direct Verdict or Motion for Judgment N.O.V. 
A. Mr. Bryant's Actions Were Reasonable Under the Circumstances and Not 
Negligent. 
Plaintiffs claim is Mr. Bryant stated he failed to yield right-of-way to the 
plaintiff; and therefore, he admitted to the court and jury he was negligent as a matter of 
law. Accordingly, the argument is the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict or 
enter a judgment n.o.v. because he was negligent. 
However, Mr. Bryant's factual statement does not automatically lead to a legal 
conclusion of negligence. Negligence simply means the failure to use reasonable care 
under the circumstances. Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985). 
Negligence depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Meese v. Brigham Young 
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University, 639 P.2d 720 (Utah 1981). The jury in this case determined Mr. Bryant's 
conduct was reasonable for him in the situation in which he was faced. 
On review, this Court should review the evidence in a light most favorable to Mr. 
Bryant, and afford him all the reasonable inferences from that evidence which would 
support the jury verdict. Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 
(Utah 1979); Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995). Appellate courts should 
not lightly disturb jury verdicts. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, on remand 840 P.2d 
796 (Utah 1992). As stated by the Utah Supreme Court: 
We do not mean to imply that rulings by the court which decide 
factual contention as a matter of law are never appropriate. But the 
right to trial by jury is a basic principle of our system that cannot be 
eroded by improper intrusions on the jury prerogative. 
Id. at 220. 
In the Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983) case, the Utah 
Supreme Court cited with approval other Utah cases which have determined that 
negligence must be examined under the "totality of the circumstances" approach. Id. at 
221, citing with approval Collier v. Frerichs, 626 P.2d 476 (Utah 1981); Fretz v. 
Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d 642 (1956); Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah 401, 62 
P.2d 117 (1936). 
The purpose of the Utah Comparative Negligence statute is to allow the jury to 
make the determination of the relative culpability of the parties to a lawsuit. The jury 
must assess the reasonableness or unreasonableness or the parties "in light of all the 
circumstances." Id. at 222. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the question of whether a driver making 
a left-hand turn failed to perform his duty in yielding right-of-way to an on-coming 
driver prior to the collision is a jury question. Smith v. Gallegos, 400 P.2d 570 (Utah 
1965). In Smith, the truck driver Jones was making a left-hand turn when he was struck 
by a truck driven by Gallegos. Because Jones failed to yield right-of-way as he executed 
his left-turn, the issue on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was whether Jones was 
negligent as a matter or law for his failure to yield right-of-way as set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6-73 (1953 as amended). Admitted was the fact Jones failed to yield. The 
issue was whether the failure to yield automatically resulted in a breach of Jones' duty to 
exercise due care under the circumstances. The Utah Supreme Court rejected the 
argument of the plaintiff (the same argument raised in this appeal). The Utah Supreme 
Court held: 
Justice does not sanction any such favoring of one party at the expense 
of the other. It imposes upon all drivers, including not only the left turner 
(respondent Jones), but also upon the oncoming vehicle (appellant Gallegos) 
the fundamental duty which pervades the entire law of torts and from which 
no one is at any time excused: to use that degree of care which a reasonable 
and prudent person would use under the circumstances for the safety of 
himself and others. 
Id. at 572. 
The appellant Smith argued that because the accident happened when the driver 
Jones failed to yield the right-of-way, the statutory duty under Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 
(1953 as amended) had been breached. The driver making the left-hand turn who failed 
to yield was, therefore, negligent. [The plaintiff in this case has likewise argued that 
because Mr. Bryant failed to yield, he is automatically negligent]. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected this simplistic analysis and stated: 
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It is not reasonable to suppose that it was intended [the left-hand 
turn statute] to compel a left turner to sit interminably at an intersection 
in fear that if he attempts to turn he will be "fair game" for anyone who 
could manage to strike him. Conceding the appellant's assertion that the 
accident itself it proof that there was a hazard, this does not necessarily 
prove that it was, or should have been, apparent to the plaintiff that there 
was a hazard of his being struck during the time he would be moving in 
the intersection. No one should be obliged to accept any such "a rose is 
a rose" type of reasoning as to permit appellant to say, 'Well, I hit you, 
so I must have been a hazard." This would be manifestly unfair and would 
result in concluding that at any time a left turner got hit he must have been 
at fault; and this no matter how reckless or unlawful the driving of the 
other car might have been. 
Id. at 571. 
Mr. Bryant, the defendant and appellee, in this case factually stated he failed to 
yield to the plaintiffs vehicle. However, his statement does not automatically require the 
trial court (or this Court) to hold he was negligent. His fundamental duty under Utah tort 
law is to "use that degree of care which a reasonable and prudent person would use under 
the circumstances for the safety of himself and others." Id. at 572. The jury found he did 
not violate that duty under the totality of the facts presented to the jury and found Mr. 
Bryant was not negligent. 
Mr. Bryant was in heavy, bumper to bumper, traffic conditions (T. Vol. I 1067). 
Northbound traffic in the outside lane of travel had been instructed to merge into the 
center lane on several occasions prior to the accident site (T. Vol. I 1094). Mr. Bryant 
had pulled into the center turn lane and had to wait for someone to be kind to let him 
through (T. Vol. I 1067). A UTA bus stopped and halted traffic in the inside northbound 
lane of travel to allow Mr. Bryant to execute his left-hand turn (T. Vol. I 1080). Mr. 
Bryant could not see through the bus (T. Vol. I 1080). He had to rely upon the bus driver, 
a professional driver, to help him through the intersection (T. Vol. I 1067). The bus 
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driver had a mirror on the side of the bus giving him good visibility down the right-hand 
side of the bus (T. Vol. I 1068). The bus driver was looking into the mirror, looked back 
at Mr. Bryant, and gave him the motion to come through (T. Vol. I 1068). As Mr. Bryant 
started to turn left, the bus driver quickly raised his hand and indicated Mr. Bryant should 
stop, so he did (T. Vol. I 1068). The bus driver continued to look in his mirror, looked 
back at Mr. Bryant and gave him the motion to proceed (T. Vol. I 1068). Mr. Bryant was 
relying upon the bus, which blocked his vision of the on-coming northbound traffic, to 
help him safely through the intersection (T. Vol. I 1067). The accident happened at the 
exact moment Mr. Bryant's line of vision was capable to see around the bus (T. Vol. I 
1068). 
The jury concluded Mr. Bryant was not negligent under these circumstances. 
While factually an accident happened because Mr. Bryant failed to yield, his failure to do 
so under the situation where he was totally relying upon the bus driver (because he could 
not see through the bus and the bus driver had assumed a duty of affirmatively acting and 
directly his traffic movements) was determined by the jury to not be negligence. "It is 
elementary that where there is dispute in the evidence, resolving the conflicts is for the 
jury under its prerogative as the exclusive finder of the facts." Id. at 572. Further, 
because the jury found in favor of Mr. Bryant, this court should accept his version of the 
accident and all inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to him. 
Id. at 573. In reviewing the evidence, a reasonable basis exists for the jury verdict, and 
the jury's verdict should be affirmed. See also, Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 
P.2d 461 (Utah 1996), in reviewing jury verdicts, the Utah Supreme Court views the 
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evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict and assumes the jury believed those 
aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment. 
The plaintiff and appellant argues the trial court improperly failed to grant a 
motion for directed verdict on the issue of liability because Mr. Bryant stated he failed to 
yield right-of-way. Mr. Bryant's factual statement does not equate to a legal conclusion 
he violated Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 (1953 as amended). In denying the motion, the 
trial court stated the issue of whether Mr. Bryant was negligent was still a jury question 
(T. Vol. II 1342). The trial court's decision was correct in light of the Utah Appellate 
Court cases on left-hand turns. 
In McCloud v. Baum, 569 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court was 
faced with a similar appeal. The plaintiff/appellant brought the appeal alleging the trial 
court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict or motion for judgment not 
withstanding the verdict when he ran into the defendant who made a left hand turn in 
front of him. (The standard of review for denial of a motion for directed verdict and 
judgment n.o.v. is the same ~ both raise the issue of the legal sufficiency of the evidence. 
Both are reviewed by an appellate court in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party and afford him the benefit "of all inferences which the evidence fairly supports." 
Id. at 1127.) 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected the arguments and stated: u[W]hat is 
reasonable safety depends upon the facts in the particular case." Id. A left-hand turn 
does not automatically equate to negligence. Id. at 1128. 
Bradley Bryant's statement in this case was he was relying on the individual 
driving the bus to help him through the intersection (T. Vol. I 1067). The jury found this 
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reliance was reasonable. While in his mind he felt he had failed to yield right-of-way to 
Mr. Durrant, the jury did not find his conduct negligent even after making the statement. 
The jury found Mr. Bryant acted with reasonable safety in light of the facts in the case. 
B. Violation of a Safety Standard Set by Statute is Not Negligence Per Se. 
No instruction was given to the jury which provided that violation of Utah Code. 
Ann. §41-6-73 (1953 as amended) had occurred. Instead MUJI 5.17 jury instruction on 
left turns was given. While Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 (1953 as amended) is cited as a 
reference, the instruction goes further than the statute and instructs the jury that: "A 
driver is not compelled to remain in an intersection indefinitely waiting to turn. The 
driver must make reasonable observations and yield when reasonably necessary (R. 
803)." The jury found Mr. Bryant acted reasonably, and the issue of statutory violation 
was never reached. 
Further, even if the plaintiff had requested and the court had instructed the jury as 
to Mr. Bryant's potential violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-73 (1953 as amended), 
violation of a statute is not negligence per se. "It is a general rule of Utah law that 
violation of a safety standard set by statute or ordinance constitutes prima facie evidence 
of negligence." Ryan v. Gold Cross Services, Inc., 903 P.2d 423 (Utah 1995). Prima 
facie evidence of negligence may be overcome by proof by the defendant of his non-
negligent conduct. "It is sufficient to state the violation of a statute is evidence of 
negligence but 'subject to justification or excuse if the evidence is such that it reasonably 
could be found that the conduct was nevertheless within the standard of reasonable care 
under the circumstances.'" Id. at 1135; quoting from Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 
Utah 2d 30, 395 P.3d 62, 64 (1964). As stated by this Court in Gaw v. State By and 
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Through DOT, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990): "[T]he violation of a statute does not 
necessarily constitute negligence per se and may be considered only as evidence of 
negligence . . . [The violation] may be regarded as 'prima facie evidence of negligence, 
but is subject to justification or excuse . . ."' Id. at 1135; quoting from Thompson v. Ford 
Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 P.3d 62, 64 (1964), emphasis in original. 
Had the jury been instructed, the jury could have concluded a violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §41-6-73 (1953 as amended) occurred. The jury could have concluded the 
violation was justified under the totality of the situation, especially after being instructed 
Mr. Bryant did not have to wait indefinitely and was directed by the bus driver to 
proceed. His actions were reasonable and justified. Likewise, the jury could have 
concluded Mr. Bryant was faced with an emergency situation caused by the conditions 
and could not obey the law, or had made reasonable efforts to obey the law, but was 
unable to do so (R. 792). Enough evidence exists to draw inferences in support of the 
jury's verdict of no negligence on the part of Mr. Bryant. 
In Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d 215 (1951), the Utah Supreme 
Court was faced with a similar appeal. The defendant/appellant contended the trial court 
erred by failing to grant a motion for a direct verdict when the evidence demonstrated the 
plaintiff made a left turn after traffic had stopped in two lanes for her to proceed. 
However, her vision of the third lane was blocked, and when she proceeded into the third 
lane of travel, she was struck. Her actions, the defendant/appellants argued, constituted 
negligence as a matter of law because she failed to yield right-of-way. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected the argument and held the evidence was sufficient to require submission of 
the case to the jury. Id. at 150. 
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Mr. Bryant's conduct was not negligence per se. Even if his statement of failing 
to yield is some evidence of negligence, the jury concluded justification or excuse existed 
which permitted his actions. The jury verdict should be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN CONDUCTING VOIR DIRE 
A. Plaintiff Failed to Preserve the Jury Questionnaire Issue for Appeal. 
Plaintiff failed to make a motion to submit the jury questionnaire prior to the jury 
being impaneled on February 18, 1997. Further, the plaintiffs counsel was given the 
opportunity to personally voir dire the jurors about any potential personal bias (T. Vol. I 
994-1004) and was "afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary 
to evaluate jurors." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). The plaintiff s 
counsel passed the jury for cause (T. Vol. I 1004). Counsel for the plaintiff did not object 
to the impaneling of the jury (T. Vol. I 1019, 1029). The plaintiffs counsel failure to 
object and raise the issue at trial precludes the argument on appeal. State v. Irwin, 924 
P.2d 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
This Court's decision in Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391 (Utah App. 1995) 
is controlling. In the Rasmussen case, the plaintiff complained the trial court did not 
allow her to formulate and ask questions necessary to reveal any bias on the juror's part. 
The plaintiff and appellate in this case complains the trial court did not allow him to ask 
questions to reveal bias on any potential juror's part. This Court in Rasmussen rejected 
the argument and stated: 
The transcript shows the court invited counsel from both sides 
to question Branscomb. The court said nothing to limit the form or 
substance of counsels' questions. After the two questions Rasmussen's 
counsel chose to ask, he did not say he wished to pose further questions. 
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Thus, he did not present the trial court an opportunity to rule on this 
issue and we will not address it further on appeal. 
Id. at 395. 
Likewise, the plaintiff in this action has failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
B. The Trial Court's Questioning of the Jury was Reasonable. 
Trial court's questioning of potential jurors is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391 (Utah App. 1995); Hornsby 
v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 113 
P.2d 45 (Utah 1988); Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1991). The questioning of 
a juror "is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its rulings with 
respect thereto will not be disturbed on appeal absent a demonstrated abuse of 
discretion." Rasmussen at 394; quoting from Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App.) cert denied, 113 P.2d 45 (Utah 1988). The abuse 
of discretion standard requires the appellate court to find error "only when the record 
clearly indicates that the decision [regarding the scope of questioning] was unreasonable." 
Rasmussen at 394; quoting from State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1995). 
A trial court abuses its discretion and commits reversible error only when "considering 
the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain 
the information necessary to evaluate jurors." Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 
1991); quoting from State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988). 
The jury voir dire questioning lasted the entire morning of the first day of trial (T. 
Vol. I 899-1030). The trial court conducted extensive voir dire into the background and 
potential biases of prospective jurors (T. Vol. I 899-995). During the trial court's voir 
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dire, the trial court excused 10 jurors for cause (T. Vol. I 899-955). Thereafter, the trial 
court did not limit the questioning by any of the attorneys representing the parties in the 
action (T. Vol. I 955-1030). The jury was impaneled only after all were satisfied with the 
panel (T. Vol. 11030). 
The trial court had the advantaged position of evaluating and determining the 
impartiality of the jurors. The Utah Supreme Court has stated that: "Due consideration 
should be given to the trial judge's somewhat advantaged position in determining which 
persons would be fair and impartial jurors. . ." Jenkins v. Parrishu 627 P.2d 533, 536 
(Utah 1981). 
Plaintiffs sole argument in regard to the jury panel was the court failed to submit 
a questionnaire to the jury which contained questions about tort reform. Specifically, the 
questionnaire asked: "1) Have you read magazine or newspaper articles or other literature 
suggesting there is a lawsuit crisis or the need for "tort reform"? 2) Have you read any 
articles or other literature suggesting that jury verdicts are excessive or unreasonable? 3) 
Have you heard anything on television or radio about a lawsuit crisis or excessive jury 
verdicts? 4) Do you hold the opinion that in this country today there is a lawsuit crisis 
caused by excessive jury verdicts? And 5) Do you feel insurance premiums are too high 
due to excessive lawsuits and/or jury verdicts?" (Brief of Appellant, Appendix No. 3). 
The trial court specifically asked about publicity regarding excessive judgments 
and to assist the jury, mentioned two cases involving large verdicts (7-Up cap and 
McDonald's coffee) (T. Vol. I 923). The trial court specifically informed the jury that a 
lot of publicity had resulted from excessive judgments from which "tort reform" or "the 
need to change the system" was suggested (T. Vol. I 923). The trial court then 
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specifically asked if anyone had a preconceived notion about whether the plaintiff should 
win or lose or how much money the plaintiff should recover if he won (T. Vol. I 924). 
Although not mentioned first by the court, questions regarding insurance were also 
covered (T. Vol. I 925, 930-934). One juror was specifically excused because he had 
strong feeling about frivolous lawsuits (T. Vol. I 929). 
In reviewing the questions asked by the trial court, while not worded exactly as 
plaintiff requested, the trial court did question the jury about "tort reform," "excessive 
verdicts," and "insurance" (T. Vol. I 923-933). The trial court, thereafter, did not limit 
further inquiry by the plaintiffs counsel. Jurors were excused for cause. Further, the 
plaintiff had the opportunity to gather information necessary to utilize any peremptory 
challenges. The peremptory challenges were exercised, and no objection was made. 
The voir dire in this trial promoted the purposes set forth by this Court. Voir dire 
of a jury panel serves two purposes: "1) to allow counsel to uncover biases of individual 
jurors sufficient to support a for-cause challenge and 2) to gather information enabling 
counsel to intelligently use peremptory challenges." Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 
(Utah App. 1993). The reasonable questioning by the court and counsel accomplished 
these purposes. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in the Voir Dire Process. 
The plaintiff and appellant claims the failure to ask specific questions on the jury 
questionnaire was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal of the jury verdict. While 
the plaintiff does not specifically identify what more the trial court could or should have 
asked, the totality of the questioning evidences the trial court's examination of the jurors 
satisfied the purposes of voir dire. Like this Court found in the Evans case: 
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Given the totality of the questioning allowed and in 
light of the extensive, two-hour voir dire, we cannot say the 
trial court abused its discretion such that we must reverse. 
The trial court asked many questions that would allow Corinne to 
intelligently exercise her peremptory challenges, including 
an inquiry into the juror's occupations, background, and 
feelings about medical malpractice law in general. Further, 
when the trial court asked potential jurors if they could not 
be impartial because of an exposure to tort-reform information, 
two indicated they could not be impartial and the trial 
court excused them. Accordingly, an examination of the totality 
of questioning leads us to conclude the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in conducting voir dire. 
Evans, 824 P.2d at 468. 
The trial court in this case likewise conducted a thorough investigation into the 
background, bias and opinions of the jury. The judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury found Bradley Bryant to not be negligent. The jury had the favored 
position of being in the courtroom, evaluating the evidence presented, judging the 
demeanor of the witnesses, and in their collective reasoning determined Mr. Bryant was 
not negligent. This Court should affirmed their decision. 
The jury selection process was extensive and without restriction. Peremptory 
challenges were made with knowledge. No abuse of discretion occurred in not 
administering a potentially biased jury questionnaire. This Court should affirmed the trial 
court's decision. 
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